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Abstract—In their seminal paper [1], Orda, Rom
and Shimkin have already studied fully symmetric
routing games, i.e. games in which all players have
the same sources, destinations, demands and costs.
They established the uniqueness of an equilibrium
in these games. We extend their result to weaker
forms of symmetry, which does not require a common
source or destination. Considering routing games,
we provide conditions under which whenever there
is some symmetry between some players, then any
equilibrium necessarily has these symmetry property
as well. We then extend the symmetry result to
general games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Symmetry is a phenomena frequently encoun-
tered in game applications, such as in telecom-
munication networks; often there are some agents
(users) that have similar utilities and similar
”views” of the network. Such potential symme-
try can have various implications. First it can be
used to conclude some qualitative properties of the
game: existence and/or uniqueness of equilibria,
and even symmetry in the equilibrium strategy. It
can further be exploited for computation purposes
in order to obtain simple algorithms for computing
equilibria. This is indeed desirable as it is well
known that the determination either analytically or
numerically of a Nash equilibrium can be a very
challenging problem due to complexity issues.
Already in [1], the authors have highlighted the
role of symmetry in routing games and showed
that networks with general topologies have unique
symmetric equilibria if the game is symmetric and
the cost satisfies some convexity properties. The
notion of symmetry was stronger than the one
we are interested in: it required in particular, all
players to have the same source and destination.
We begin by establishing uniqueness results for
routing games under more general concepts of
symmetry that do not have the above restrictions.
We then extend the scope to symmetric properties
of equilibria in arbitrary games.
II. ROUTING GAMES
We consider here an atomic game, in the sense
that there are a finite (or perhaps a discrete) number
of decision makers. Yet the game is splitable: each
decision maker can decide what fraction of its
demand would be routed on each link. So far,
uniqueness was established for these games either
for some very simple topologies (the case of par-
allel links and its generalizations [2],[3]) or under
specific conditions on the cost functions (see e.g.
[4]). In case of general topologies and costs, Orda
et al. have shown that the equilibrium is unique
if all players are equal (same source, destination,
demand etc). The general set of conditions that
are sufficient and necessary for the uniqeness of
equilibrium remain an open problem, alghough
some considerable progress has been done since
[1], see [2].
Let G = (N ,L, I,P) be a network routing
game with N the set of nodes and L the set of
links, I is the set of classes (e.g. players), and
P = (si, di, φi) is a set that characterizes class
i: si is the source, di is the destination and φi is
the demand related to player i.
We describe the system with respect to the
variables xil which denote the amount of flow that
player i sends over link l. They are restricted by
the non-negativity constraints for each link l and
player i: xil ≥ 0 and by the conservation constraints
for each player i and each node v:
riv +
∑
j∈In(v)
xij =
∑
j∈Out(v)
xij (1)
where riv = φ
i if v is the source node for player i,
riv = −φi if v is its destination node, and riv = 0
otherwise; In(v) and Out(v) are respectively all
ingoing and outgoing links of node v. (φi is the
total demand of player i).
A player i determines the routing decisions for
all the traffic that corresponds to the corresponding
class i. The cost of player i is assumed to be
additive over links
J i(x) =
∑
l
J il (xl). (2)
Here xl = (xil, i ∈ I) and x = (xl, l ∈ L).
We shall assume that
(i) Kil :=
∂Jil (x)
∂xil
exist and are continuous in xil
(for all i and l),
(ii) J il are convex in x
i
l (for all i and l),
We shall often make the following assumption
for each link l and player i:
A1: J il depends on xl only through the total flow
xl =
∑
i x
i
l and the flow of x
i
l of player i
over the link.
A2: J il is increasing in both arguments
A3: Whenever J il is finite, Kil (xl, xil) is
strictly increasing in both arguments.
Sometimes we further restrict the cost to satisfy the
following:
B1: For each link l there is a nonnegative cost
density Tl(xl) Tl is a function of the total
flow through the link and J il = x
i
lTl(xl).
B2: Tl is positive, strictly increasing and convex,
and is continuously differentiable.
The Lagrangian Li(x, λ) with respect to the con-
straints on the conservation of flow is
∑
l∈L
J il (xl)+
∑
v∈N
λiv
riv + ∑
j∈In(v)
xij −
∑
j∈Out(v)
xij
 ,
for each player i.
Below we shall use uv to denote the link defined by
node pair u, v.
Thus a vector x with nonnegative components satis-
fying (1) for all i and v is an equilibrium if and only
if the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition
holds:
There exist Lagrange multipliers λiu for all nodes u
and all players, i, such that for each pair of nodes u, v
connected by a directed link uv,
Kiuv(x
i
uv, xuv) ≥ λiu − λiv, (3)
with equality if xuv > 0.
Assume cost structure B. Then, the Lagrangian
Li(x, λ) is given by
∑
l∈L
xilTl(xl)+
∑
v∈N
λiv
riv + ∑
j∈In(v)
xij −
∑
j∈Out(v)
xij
 ,
for each player i.
(3) can be written as
Tuv(xuv) + x
i
uv
∂Tuv(xuv)
∂xiuv
≥ λiu − λiv. (4)
Definition 1. (Symmetry in Routing games). Introduce
a map Θ : N → N and some permutaiton pi of I.
Define the game G′ = Γ(G,Θ, pi) = (N ′,L′, I′,P ′)
as follows.
• N ′ = N , I′ = I.
• For each player i in the game G, characterized by
Pi = (si, di, φi) we have for the corresponding
player i′ = pi(i) in the game G′ characterized by
Pi′ = (si′ , di′ , φi′):
si
′
= Θ(si), di
′
= Θ(di), and φi
′
= φi.
• A link u′v′ is in L′ if and only if u′ = Θ(u),
v′ = Θ(v) for some uv ∈ L, and J i′u′v′ = J iuv for
i′ = pi(i), i ∈ I.
If for a given game G, there exists a permutation pi such
that G = Γ(G,Θ, pi) then we say that G is symmetric
under Θ.
A routing policy x is symmetric under Θ if for all i, l,
xil = x
pi(i)
Θ(l).
A. Uniqueness result
We shall show that symmetric games have only sym-
metric equilibria. We use here type A cost.
Indeed, let x be an equilibrium in a symmetric game
with Θ and pi. and assume that for some i, l, xil 6= xpi(i)Θ(l).
Construct a network Gˆ as following. The nodes are
the same as in G. If for some link m = uv, Dm 6= 0
where
Dm = x
i
m − xpi(i)Θ(m)
then m is included in Gˆ. It is assigned an amount |Dm|
of flow that goes from u to v if Dm > 0, and from v
to u otherwise.
Note that the flow conservation constraints hold.
Indeed, at any node u which is not a source nor a
destination, since the conservation constraints hold in the
original game for that node, they also hold for node Θ(u)
and thus also to their difference. If node u is the source
or destination node for player i then so is node Θ(u) for
player pi(i). Therefore the difference between the flows
corresponding to these two players at u and Θ(u) also
satisfy the flow conservation.
It follows from the assumption in the beginning of
the proof that the flow on link l in the new network is
strictly nonnegative. This, together with the fact that the
new graph has no exogeneous source nor destination,
imply that there is a closed circuit (sequence of links)
ξ that contains link l such that all links on that circuit
carry strictly positive flow. For any link m = uv in this
circuit we have
0 < Kiuv(x
i
uv, xuv)−Kpi(i)Θ(uv)(xpi(i)Θ(uv), xiΘ(uv))
= λiu − λiv − (λpi(i)Θ(u) − λpi(i)Θ(v))
The first inequality holds since K is strictly monotone
in its first component. Taking the sum over all links in
ξ, we get 0 < 0 which is impossible. This concludes the
proof by contradiction.
III. ROUTING GAME ON THE CIRCLE:
TRANSMIT OR RELAY
We shall introduce an example of symmetric routing
games, in which symmetry holds in a weaker sense than
in [1]. They are related to a circular network in which
there is symmetry under a rotation as depicted in Figure
1.
Consider a circle with nodes on the integers
1, 2, ..., N . With each node we associate a distinct player.
Node i has a demand of φi to ship to a destination
common to all nodes. It has two paths for shipping
traffic: either directly to the destination, using a link
whose cost function is f , or use the next node, i + 1,
on the circle. Forwarding it to the next node prior to the
final destination costs an aditional fixed amount of d. We
denote by g the derivative of f . i+1 will be understood
below in the cyclic sense so that i+1 = 1 when i = N .
Fig. 1. Competitive routing on the circle: a common
destination
The cost for player i is
J i(x) = xiif(xi) + (φ
i − xii)(f(xi+1) + d) (5)
where i = 1, ..., N . If xii is an interior point, i.e. it
is neither on the boundary φ nor on that of 0, then a
necessary condition for xii to be a minimum is that the
following partial derivative equals zero:
∂J i(x)
∂xii
= f(xi)+x
i
ig(xi)−(φi−xii)g(xi+1)−f(xi+1)−d
Hence
xii =
d+ f(xi+1)− f(xi) + φig(xi+1)
g(xi) + g(xi+1)
(6)
so that
φi − xii = −d− f(xi+1) + f(xi) + φ
ig(xi)
g(xi) + g(xi+1)
and also
xi+1i+1 =
d+ f(xi+2)− f(xi+1) + φi+1g(xi+2)
g(xi+1) + g(xi+2)
Taking the sum, we obtain the load of link i+ 1,
xi+1 =
−d− f(xi+1) + f(xi) + φig(xi)
g(xi) + g(xi+1)
+
d+ f(xi+2)− f(xi+1) + φi+1g(xi+2)
g(xi+1) + g(xi+2)
where i = 1, ..., N . One of the equations can be replaced
by
∑N
i=1(xi − φi) = 0.
Next assume that all players send their flow on their
direct link. We check whether player i can do better. Dif-
ferentiating the cost function (5) w.r.t. xii and substituting
xii = φ
i yields
∂J i(x)
∂xii
= f(φi) + φig(φi)− f(φi+1)− d
Sending all flow on the direct link is an equilibrium if
this is non-positive.
In particular, if φi are equal, then sending all traffic
through direct links is an equilibrium provided that
φg(φ) ≤ d.
The homogeneous case.
Assume φi = φ does not depend on i. At equilibrium
we always have xi = φ. Indeed, we know from the last
section that only symmetric equilibria exist. Therefore xi
do not depend on i. Combining it with the flow constraint
results in xi = φ. This then implies that
xii − (φ− xii)− d
g(φ)
= 0
So that
xii =
φ
2
+
d
2g(φ)
Note that a necessary condition for this to be an equi-
librium is that xii ≥ φ or equivalently that
d ≤ φg(φ).
IV. SYMMETRY IN GENERAL GAMES
Consider a game with a set I of I players. Let
Ai ⊂ Rn(i) be a convex set of strategies available
to player i. Denote by A the set of multistrategies
{a = (a1, ..., aI), i ∈ Ai}. Let J i be the cost for player
i, and let J be the vector of the I payoffs of the players.
Next, we define symmetry. Introduce a permutation pi
on the set I. Define the correspoding operator Θ(pi) that
maps A to A′ = (Api(1), · · · ,Api(I)) as follows:
Θ(pi)a = (api(1), ..., api(I)).
A game is said to be symmetric under a permutation pi
if for each player i and multistrategy a,
J i(a) = Jpi(i)(Θ(pi)a).
We have the following obvious Theorem
Theorem 1. Suppose that we have a game that is
symmetric under a permutation pi.
Then if a is an equilibrium then so is Θ(pi)a.
A. Two symmetric players
Consider a game which is symmetric under a permu-
tation of a single pair of players, i.e. the permutation that
only alters between i and j, i.e. pi(i) = j, pi(j) = i and
pi(k) = k for k /∈ {i, j}.
Assumption 1. Consider a game which is symmetric
under a permutation of a single pair of players, i and
j. Assume that for any multi-strategy a, the following
holds. If the best response for player i against a−i) is
ai and ai 6= aj , then the best response of player j to
the strategy a−j is different than aj .
Remark 1. Assume that J are differentiable and that Ai
and Aj are open. A sufficient condition for Assumption
1 to be satisfied is that
∂J i(a)
∂ai
6= ∂J
j(a)
∂aj
(7)
This condition appears to be easier to verify.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then any
Nash equilibrium is symmetrical, under pi, i.e. if a∗ is
an equilibrium then so is Θ(pi)a∗.
Proof:
This follows by contradiction, obtained by combining
Theorem 1 with Assumption 1.
Theorem 3. Consider a game which is symmetric under
a permutation of a single pair of players, i and j. Let
ni = nj = 1 (i.e. Ai and Aj are scalars). Then the
following is a sufficient condition for Assumption 1 to
hold:
J i is a strictly convex function in the direction dij =
ei − ej where ek is the unit vector whose kth entry is 1
and the rest are zero. In other words,
J i(a+ θdij)− J i(a)
is increasing in θ. Equivalently,
∂J i(a)
∂ai
≥ ∂J
i(a)
∂aj
with equality holding only if ai = aj .
B. Submodular game
Consider a two player game.
A cost function J i is said to be strictly submodular
if for any different actions a and b, the utility satisfies
J i(b, b) + J i(a, a)− J i(a, b)− J i(b, a) > 0
Assume that (a, a) and (b, b) are different symmetrical
equilibria, we have
J i(b, b)− J i(a, b) ≤ 0, and
J i(a, a)− J i(b, a) ≤ 0
Summing the two last equations gives a contradiction to
the submodularity assumption. We conclude that there
may not exist more than one symmetric equilibrium in
a submodular game.
This is also another example of a sufficient condition
for Assumption 1, and hence for Theorem 2 to hold.
C. Flow control game
Consider a network with I sources, with a potential
demand of φi for class i. Let the link cost J il satisfy A
and B. For each player i, we consider a fixed routing
policy xi i.e. a set xil, l ∈ L that satisfy the flow-
conservation constraints (1). We assume that a player
i can control its total demand which is given by αiφi,
where αi, the decision variable of player i is assumed
to lie within some interval [α, α]. The proportions of the
demand that a player sends to each link are equal to
those that are used according to xi; they are assumed to
be fixed and not to depend on αi. Thus player i sends
αixil over link l.
Let the cost for player i be given as
J i(α) =
∑
l
αixilTl(
∑
i′
αi
′
xi
′
l )−Q(αiφi)
The first term is the same delay cost that we had in the
routing games. The second term represents a cost that is
a function of the demand: Q is assumed to be a concave
increasing function.
Now,
∂J i(α)
∂αi
=
∑
l
xilTl(
∑
i′
αi
′
xi
′
l ) + x
i
lT
′
l (
∑
i′
αi
′
xi
′
l )
−φiQ′(αiφi)
which is strictly increasing in αi. Using Remark 1 one
can obtain the following:
Theorem 4. Assume that the flow control game is
symmetric under some Θ, for some routing policy x.
Then any equilibrium is symmetric under Θ.
Note: there is a standard way to transform a flow
control game into a routing game with a fixed demand.
Thus the above theorem would follow from correspond-
ing results in routing game, such as we saw in Section
II-A.
V. CONCLUDING SECTION
We investigated in this paper symmetric games start-
ing with routing games and then extending to general
non-cooperative games. We provided simple conditions
under which symmetric properties of the costs in a game
imply the same symmetric properties in any equilibria.
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